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Abstract: The welfare benefits system in the UK has historically favoured individuals who conform 
to gender stereotypes: it also increasingly uses surveillance and conditionality to determine who is 
‘deserving’ of support. This paper argues that this combination reinforces structures of 
categorisation and control, risking a vicious cycle which causes harm at both an individual and 
societal level: it also argues that human rights offers a tool for analysis and resistance to this harm. 
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Introduction 
The UK welfare benefits system has undergone significant changes since it was in-
troduced in its modern form after World War II. Over more than 70 years, succes-
sive governments have shifted their focus away from universal support, and placed 
more and more demands on claimants to prove that they are ‘deserving’. In this pa-
per, I will examine the operation of the UK welfare benefits system, and in particu-
lar the ways that it utilises both gender stereotyping and surveillance, thus harm-
ing both individuals and society as a whole. 
In the first section, I will consider how international law views gender and gender 
stereotypes: in section 2, I will examine how, since the 1940s, the welfare system 
in the UK has operated based on stereotypes and assumptions, particularly about 
the roles of poor women within families. In the third section, I will track the devel-
opment of surveillance in the UK welfare benefits system, and examine how in-
creased conditionality of welfare benefits—distribution based on behaviour, not 
need—has used surveillance to track compliance and impose sanctions on those 
who do not behave according to requirements. 
In Section 4, I will argue that surveillance—in particular data-based surveil-
lance—and gender stereotyping act to reinforce each other, creating a vicious cycle 
in which the surveilled are incentivised to conform, and the non-conforming are 
increasingly surveilled. I will focus in this section on the ways that gender stereo-
types and data-based surveillance act to categorise and to control individuals. Fi-
nally, in Section 5, I will argue that the increased use of surveillance in the welfare 
system in the UK increases the extent to which welfare claimants are monitored 
for compliance with gender norms and stereotypes, risking a vicious cycle in which 
claimants, fearing discrimination and denial of benefits, are increasingly coerced 
into compliance, and suggest how human rights can frame and support resistance. 
Gender and gender stereotyping in international 
human rights law 
Defining gender 
In this article, I will define gender as the cultural and social meanings ascribed as 
a result of the legal, social and/or self-determined classification into one or more 
identities. This definition is based on human rights law, specifically by the UN 
Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW Committee): “socially constructed identities, attributes and roles,” based on 
whether someone is (or is not) male or female, and the cultural and social mean-
ing ascribed to people as a result (General Recommendation No.28, 2010, para. 5). 
However, it is important to note that the CEDAW Committee’s definition is binary, 
considering only two genders: male and female. While the Committee recognises 
that a wide range of factors, including cultural and social factors, can have an im-
pact on gender, they neglect to recognise that not everyone fits neatly within a bi-
nary gender model. Historically many cultures recognised—and continue to recog-
nise—non-binary genders in society,1 several countries now allow for legal recog-
nition of genders apart from male and female,2 and still more people living out-
side of these countries identify as non-binary or other gender identities, even if 
these are not recognised in law or widely understood in society. Consequently, the 
way in which genders outside of the binary are—or are not—recognised in law, in 
society, or at an individual level in different contexts remains relevant to this 
analysis. 
Defining stereotypes 
A stereotype is a “belief about the characteristics of groups of individuals”(Stangor, 
2000, p. 1): gender stereotypes, therefore, are beliefs about the characteristics of 
individuals based on their gender. Gender stereotypes are culturally and temporal-
ly specific, but the existence of gender stereotypes—sets of beliefs about individu-
als, based on their gender identity or their social or legal gender—persists across 
social sectors, across cultures, and across time.3 
1. For example, hijra in India, or two-spirit people in some Native American cultures. 
2. For example, Australia issues passports with an ‘X’ marker in place of ‘F’ or ‘M’, Germany allows 
birth certificates to have “divers” as a third option or no gender marker at all, and India issues pass-
ports with ‘M’, ‘F’ or ‘E’ markers. 
3. Nordic countries, for example, which are recognised to have higher levels of gender equality, retain 
stereotypes about which jobs are ‘appropriate’ for people of which gender (Dairam, 2015, p. 374) 
As Stangor has pointed out, while there may be some element of truth to stereo-
types, they frequently overgeneralise: not every member of a particular group pos-
sesses a particular characteristic (Stangor, 2000, p. 7), but the nature of stereo-
types as categorisation tools means that they may be treated as though they do. 
This categorisation may be harmful: decisions made on the basis of gender stereo-
types may be inaccurate in harmful ways. For example, as Cook and Cusack point 
out, if a woman is denied a job as a firefighter on the basis that ‘women are weak’, 
even if she is herself capable of passing any strength test requirement for the job 
(Cook & Cusack, 2010, pp. 15-16). 
This is the case even when stereotypes are deployed in a way which may appear 
protective, for example in labour laws that prevent some jobs from being done by 
women, which are often rationalised as protecting women’s reproductive health. 
The CEDAW Committee has repeatedly noted that such laws in fact do not do so, 
and act instead to restrict employment and economic opportunities on the basis of 
stereotyping women as mothers (Holtmaat, 2012, pp. 157-8). 
In human rights law, stereotypes are harmful when they act in such a way as to de-
ny people their human rights (Brems & Timmer, 2016, p. 4), which include the 
right to be free from discrimination (ICESCR, 1966; ICCPR, 1966; CEDAW, 1979). 
The Committee which oversees the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) has further recognised that stereotypes can underpin 
discrimination (General Comment No. 20, 2009, para. 20). 
Privilege—relative power within the matrix of domination (Collins, 2009)—may of-
fer freedom from gender stereotypes. The consequences for non-conforming be-
haviour are less serious for people who already possess comparative freedom to 
move about the world. This has been noted in the international human rights sys-
tem. For example, the CEDAW Committee has noted that in the context of disaster 
response, “The categorization of women and girls as passive “vulnerable groups” in 
need of protection from the impacts of disasters is a negative gender stereotype” 
and that this approach fails to recognise women’s contributions in disaster prepa-
ration and response (General Recommendation No.37, 2018, para. 7). Similarly, the 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights has addressed gender stereotypes in two 
cases: the Cotton Field case in 2009 and the Atala Riffo case in 2012. In both cas-
es, the Court specifically noted the reinforced obligations of the state to protect 
people in vulnerable situations, and/or who experience structural discrimination 
(Undurraga, 2016, pp. 77–80). 
International human rights law has specifically addressed gender stereotypes and 
the harm that they can do, primarily through the CEDAW Committee General Rec-
ommendations. These include underpinning harmful practices (Joint General Rec-
ommendation No. 31 and General Comment No. 18, 2014, para. 17), contributing to 
violence and abuse against older women (General Recommendation No. 27, 2010, 
para. 16), and excluding women from post-conflict and peacebuilding efforts (Gen-
eral Recommendation No. 30, 2013, para. 43). The CEDAW Committee has stated, 
as a result of this potential for harm, that states have the obligation to address 
gender-based stereotypes, at individual, institutional and legal levels (General Rec-
ommendation No. 25, 2004, paras 7, 27). 
Gender stereotyping in the UK welfare system 
In this section, I will examine the ways in which the UK welfare system has histori-
cally relied on gender stereotyping in order to assess who should receive state 
welfare assistance. I argue that this reliance on assumptions and stereotypes 
about gender discriminates against those who do not conform to stereotypical 
norms. In particular, the UK welfare system has been designed to perpetuate the 
norm that women should be supported by a male breadwinner, with state assis-
tance only when such support is impossible to obtain. 
In the UK, the post-war Labour government under Clement Attlee (who was elect-
ed in 1945) are usually credited with the creation of the modern welfare state 
(Page, 2016, p. 126), much of which was based on the 1942 Beveridge Report. The 
reforms—including the 1946 National Insurance Act, providing for security from 
loss of wages, and the 1948 National Assistance Act, providing for security for 
those unable to work—were centred on ideas of universality and destigmatisation. 
In theory, support was available to everyone. 
In practice, however, the institutions responsible for distributing welfare benefits 
were opposed to taking on responsibilities that they believed were family respon-
sibilities (V. Noble, 2009, p. 46). Welfare policies in this period rested on stereo-
types that families were stable units over time, and that men and women had very 
different family roles: men were full-time workers while women were full-time 
carers (Haux, 2016, p. 411). Men, in other words, were considered to be breadwin-
ners, earning a ‘family wage’, while their female partners worked in the home (Par-
ton, 2014, pp. 17–18). As a result, however, welfare policies in the post-war wel-
fare state were designed to incentivise men to work and disincentivise women 
from working (Fredman, 1997, p. 84), and were focused on the family as a unit, as-
suming that benefits received by men would also benefit women and children 
(Fredman, 1997, pp. 18–30). 
This ‘male breadwinner’ model had its closest analogue in the family lives of mid-
dle-class married couples at the start of the 20th century (Lewis, 2000, p. 83) and 
the extent to which families in the UK in the 1950s conformed to this stereotype 
was debatable (Haux, 2016, p. 411). Nonetheless, welfare policies were based on 
the assumption of a male provider. One of the main reforms, the introduction of 
social security against loss of wages (as part of the National Insurance Act 1946) 
was mandatory for men and for single women. Married women, however, were not 
automatic participants, lost all credit from contributions made before their mar-
riage, and received lower benefits. The policy assumed that they would always be 
supported by their husbands and therefore needed no protection (V. Noble, 2009, 
pp. 3–4). 
Over the course of the second half of the 20th century, social security began to be 
based more on an ‘adult worker’ or ‘citizen worker’ model, which increasingly treat-
ed women as economically independent individuals (Hunter, 2016, p. 93). This was 
to some extent linked to changing patterns of family life—for example, in the early 
1970s, 8% of families were headed by a lone parent: this figure had risen to 25% 
by the early 2010s (Haux, 2016, p. 411). At the same time, there was a recognition 
that roles within families, including caring responsibilities, were shifting. The 1980 
Social Security Act allowed (via complicated calculations) for the possibility of ei-
ther partner in a relationship to claim non-contributory benefits, and from 1988 
couples were allowed to choose which partner claimed these benefits (Fredman, 
1997, p. 171). 
However, the norm of the ‘male breadwinner’ persisted in welfare policy, even if 
not explicitly articulated. In the 1980s and 1990s, family policy shifted from being 
based on marriage to being based on parenthood, through an increased focus on 
‘parental responsibilities’ (Lewis, 2000, pp. 90–91). At the same time, under a Con-
servative government, the universalist and destigmatising approach of the post-
war welfare system was replaced by rhetoric of a welfare state ‘in crisis’ (V. Noble, 
2009, p. 144). This ‘crisis’ included blaming lone parents (who were largely 
women) for their “unnecessary dependence” on the government: in practice, as Vir-
ginia Noble has argued, a failure to secure support from a male breadwinner (V. 
Noble, 2009, p. 144). 
New Labour, which came to power in 1997, continued to blame the post-war wel-
fare state for increasing ‘dependency’ on welfare, and focused their policies on 
getting claimants (back) into the labour market (V. Noble, 2009, pp. 146–147). In 
particular, they viewed returning lone parents to work as a key solution to child 
poverty (Grabham & Smith, 2010, p. 82). 90% of single parents were women: poli-
cies designed to encourage them to work were based on assumptions that they did 
not want to work (Grabham & Smith, 2010, p. 85) or did not recognise the value of 
work (Millar, 2019, p. 88). 
This stereotype that lone parents—most of whom were women—were dependents, 
continued into the Coalition government elected in 2010, and the Conservative 
government which has been in power since 2015, both of which pursued austerity 
measures in welfare policy. A speech in 2016 by the then Secretary for Work and 
Pensions blamed the “low expectations” of lone parents for them not being in 
work (Green, 2016). Lewis has argued that lone mothers have three possible 
sources of income: the state, the labour market, and men (Lewis, 2000, p. 95). Since 
2010, the Coalition and then Conservative UK governments continued the trend of 
encouraging—or coercing—lone mothers to move from state income to employ-
ment income. In practice, most lone mothers do want to return to work, but at a 
time that makes sense for themselves and their families, under circumstances that 
makes paid work viable (Grabham & Smith, 2010, p. 85). However, welfare policies 
in the UK ignore the actual experiences of lone mothers seeking work, and instead 
assume that work is always beneficial. 
At the same time, the introduction of Universal Credit—a combined benefit replac-
ing multiple individual benefits, based on a household means test and paid to a 
single bank account—risks returning partnered women in heterosexual relation-
ships to dependence on men, and undermines women’s financial independence 
(Hunter, 2016, p. 96). For women in a cohabiting heterosexual relationship, the 
Universal Credit regime means that it is not always financially beneficial for them 
to take on work (Haux, 2016, p. 415). Almost 80 years after William Beveridge 
wrote his 1942 report—the “blueprint for the modern welfare state” (V. Noble, 
2009, p. 3)—the British welfare state has returned to considering women benefits 
claimants—regardless of their actual situation—as dependents of a male bread-
winner. In other words, the welfare benefits system continues to consider women 
not as independent actors, but instead based on stereotypes about their familial 
and social roles. 
Surveillance in the UK welfare benefits system 
In this section, I examine the ways in which the UK welfare benefits system has in-
creasingly relied on surveillance to assess welfare claimants and monitor their 
compliance with welfare conditions. 
Defining surveillance 
In this article, I use David Lyon’s definition of surveillance: “a focused attention to 
personal details aimed at exerting an influence over or managing the objects of 
the data" (Lyon, 2002, p. 242). In other words, surveillance has two components: 
the act of observation, and the intent to use that observation to effect change. Sur-
veillance, defined in this way, does not require technology, but technology makes 
surveillance easier. 
David Lyon et al. note that surveillance has become generalised: instead of target-
based surveillance (in which an individual of interest was identified and then sur-
veilled), information is now collected on as many people as possible. The authors 
attribute this not only to technical advances—including the increasing availability 
of large data sets and computational power—but also to a shift in priorities: “a con-
fluence of factors make surveillance often appear as the most appealing way to 
advance any number of institutional agendas” (Lyon et al., 2012, pp. 2–3). 
As a consequence, data-based surveillance is now widespread. Data is collected on 
a large range of people: and the target for surveillance emerges from data analysis 
(Eubanks, 2018, p. 122). Anyone who is in the data set—or who shares any of the 
same characteristics—can be observed, scrutinised and judged, as part of what 
John Cheney-Lippold has called ‘dataveillance’ (Cheney-Lippold, 2017). 
The development of welfare surveillance and dataveillance in the 
UK 
The post-war welfare state aimed to destigmatise the claiming of welfare benefits. 
This included, for example, abolishing the household means tests required by the 
1934 Unemployment Act, which was considered intrusive and humiliating for 
claimants (V. Noble, 2009, p. 17). Nonetheless, welfare claimants continued to be 
subjected to surveillance. The National Assistance Board, established in 1948 to 
oversee the provision of assistance for those not eligible for National Insurance, 
included a special investigative unit which had 60 staff by 1959: some of its inves-
tigations resulted in criminal prosecutions, but far more in denied or withdrawn 
claims for assistance (V. Noble, 2009, pp. 64–65). 
By the early 1980s, the political view of welfare had shifted from universal, com-
munity-based support to a ‘public burden’, which was placed on ‘society’, a group 
that was implicitly differentiated from welfare recipients (Mesher, 1981, pp. 
119–120). The term ‘underclass’ began to be used by social and political analysts 
to refer to people who experienced long-term unemployment. While the idea of a 
group of people who were culturally and socially excluded from the working class 
was seen as unevidenced or even politically dangerous, the ‘underclass’ became a 
group of focus for both left-wing analysts—who saw a group ‘left behind’ by social 
and economic changes—and right-wing conservatives, who believed that the term 
encapsulated a group not only unable but unwilling to work (Welshman, 2013, ch. 
8). The ‘underclass’ were seen as dependent on welfare benefits by choice. 
Continuing the century-old rhetoric of distinguishing between the ‘deserving’ and 
the ‘undeserving’ poor (Garthwaite, 2011, p. 370), and influenced by (amongst oth-
ers) right-wing writer Charles Murray (Welshman, 2013, ch. 8) (who would go on to 
co-write The Bell Curve), the UK government began to be increasingly concerned 
about abuse of the benefits system. As a result, identifying fraudulent benefit 
claimants became an increasing priority for the government (Mesher, 1981, p. 121). 
At the same time, the rise of data processing techniques enabled increasing 
amounts of data about welfare applicants to be processed, with the stated aim of 
preventing fraud, in the 1980s (Simitis, 1987). Access to state support is by defini-
tion more important for people who are more marginalised: as a result, however, 
people who are relatively powerful are less likely to be subjected to surveillance 
and data collection by the state (Koskela, 2012, p. 52). 
In the same period, the Conservative government (which came to power in 1979) 
introduced the idea of conditionality for welfare benefits: benefits which were dis-
tributed on the basis not only of need, but also of behaviour (Reeve, 2017). One of 
the first measures was the introduction of Jobsearch Diaries: records of job-search-
ing activity which claimants had to fill out in order to be eligible for unemploy-
ment benefits. These measures gave front-line advisers legal backing to require 
specific actions from the unemployed, who faced sanctions if they did not comply 
(Fletcher & Wright, 2018, pp. 227–330). 
This combination of increased attention to possible fraud, and increased surveil-
lance of behaviours, continued into the New Labour years. Post-1997 policy contin-
ued to blame the post-war welfare state for increasing dependency (V. Noble, 
2009, p. 146). The New Labour government focused on incentivising as many peo-
ple as possible into work, including people—such as lone mothers—who had not 
previously been incentivised to work (Taylor, 2017, p. 5). The government also took 
measures to increase compliance requirements for lone mothers (Haux, 2012, p. 2). 
The New Labour government spearheaded the use of technological tools, as part 
of its modernisation agenda. The focus on combating ‘social exclusion’—and get-
ting the ‘socially excluded’ (back) into work—led to an increased effort to define 
‘socially excluded’ groups more and more precisely, in order to target them for pre-
ventative measures and/or services, and thus to an increased effort to track and 
map individuals and households which might fall into this group (Pleace, 2007, pp. 
947–948). In this period, the government also considered more invasive tools: in 
2007, the government proposed (but did not implement) the use of phone-based 
lie detectors to assess benefit claimants and reduce fraud (V. Noble, 2009, p. 149). 
The ongoing programme of increasing welfare conditionality was accelerated by 
the Coalition government, who came to power in 2010. This government contin-
ued promoting the rhetoric of ‘strivers and skivers’—the latest iteration of the idea 
of ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving poor’—while pursuing an aggressively neoliberal 
agenda under which virtually no-one was considered ‘deserving’ of support (Reeve, 
2017). The aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis was used to legitimise a pro-
gramme of austerity measures, which included restructuring the welfare state 
(Wiggan, 2016, pp. 147–148), shifting from supporting unemployed people to ac-
cess work to monitoring their compliance with behavioural rules (Wright et al., 
2020, p. 291). New measures such as the Universal Jobmatch system allowed offi-
cials to remotely monitor the job-searching activity of claimants—and sanction 
them for not complying with requirements (Fletcher & Wright, 2018, p. 332). 
Surveillance and conditionality has continued under the Conservative government, 
which was elected in 2015. At the same time, the increased focus in data collec-
tion and processing has allowed increased use of ‘dataveillance’ in the UK. As of 
2017, Chichester Council was using software designed by a company, Xantura, to 
sort benefits claims—including Universal Credit applications—into low, medium or 
high-risk categories: the Council streamlined low-risk claims, and applied addition-
al checks to high-risk ones (Chichester District Council, 2017). 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights issued a report 
after his visit to the UK, in which he stated his findings that all welfare applicants 
were treated as suspicious and “screened for potential wrongdoing in a system of 
total surveillance” (OHCHR, 2018). The UK is not alone in this trend: in his 2019 
global report, the same Special Rapporteur warned of the risk of a “digital welfare 
dystopia” characterised by increased surveillance, increased welfare conditionality 
and increased punishment of beneficiaries who are deemed to “step out of line” 
(UN Special Rapporteur on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 2019, para. 77). 
Surveillance, dataveillance, and gender stereotypes 
In this section, I argue that surveillance—in particular data-based surveil-
lance—and gender stereotyping act to reinforce each other, creating a vicious cycle 
in which the surveilled are incentivised to conform, and the non-conforming are 
increasingly surveilled. I focus in this section on the ways that gender stereotypes 
and data-based surveillance act to categorise and to control individuals. 
Categorisation 
Both gender stereotypes and data-based surveillance act as categorisation tools. 
They assign individuals to categories, and treat them according to their member-
ship of this category. When decisions are made, membership of this category is 
considered, regardless of whether it is relevant for the decision, or accurate for the 
individual. For people who have been incorrectly classified—or who do not fit 
neatly into the existing classification—this can mean that they are subject to 
harmful outcomes from these decisions, such as (as discussed above) being exclud-
ed from employment. 
The data that is held on an individual by a public sector agency in the UK is not 
limited to only that which they have provided through censuses or administrative 
data collection. Data sharing between public sector agencies gained traction in the 
early 21st century as agencies sought to target specific groups more and more 
closely (Pleace, 2007, p. 948), and under the current Conservative government, 
there is an expectation—as well as legal provision, under the Digital Economy Act 
2017—that local authority agencies providing services to so-called ‘Troubled Fami-
lies’ will share data unless there is a strong reason not to (Ministry of Housing, 
Communities & Local Government, 2020, p. 1). There is also an increased interest 
in using data to create predictive models within local government (Centre for Data 
Ethics and Innovation, 2020, pp. 7–8): adding additional categorisation for individ-
uals, not necessarily with their knowledge, let alone their consent. 
Safiya Noble has argued that categorisation systems are not neutral: they prioritise 
certain kinds of information, and retain the power biases of the people who de-
signed them (S. U. Noble, 2018, p. 137). As discussed above, categorisation systems 
also incorporate the social, cultural and historical contexts within which they have 
been conceptualised, designed, and deployed. The encoding of gendered cate-
gories in data and surveillance technologies can, in particular, act to further reify 
those categories. For example, technologies which aim to automatically categorise 
individuals as male or female systematically erase trans or non-binary people from 
their systems (Keyes, 2018, p. 3). 
As well as acting alone, however, these systems act to mutually reinforce each oth-
er. The encoding of gendered categories in data and surveillance technologies can 
act to reify those categories. Understanding the parallels—as well as how gender 
stereotypes and data-based surveillance act together to reinforce inequality–offers 
up new possibilities for analysis, as well as opportunities for resistance. 
Control 
Both gender stereotypes and data-based surveillance operate as tools of control: 
they both normalise certain kinds of behaviours and existences and create a situa-
tion in which other kinds of behaviours are punished. In this way, they both act to 
reinforce and strengthen existing hierarchies of power. In addition, both data-
based surveillance and gender stereotypes can be weaponised to control their tar-
gets, and to punish behaviour that is deemed ‘wrong.’ 
As discussed above, David Lyon includes in his definition of surveillance both the 
act of observation, and the intent to effect change. There is a clear parallel here 
with the two functions of gender stereotyping: surveillance plays a descriptive 
role, observing details about an individual—and a prescriptive one, aiming to influ-
ence or manage that individual. Anja Kovacs argues that through monitoring what 
individuals are doing or have done, surveillance exercises a disciplinary power 
through incentivising certain behaviours and discouraging others (Kovacs, 2017). 
Gender stereotypes normalise some roles and behaviours, and implicitly define 
others as ‘gender non-conforming’—and therefore abnormal and suspect. Participa-
tion in society is restricted, to a greater or lesser degree, by the extent to which an 
individual is prepared to conform to a gender stereotype. This is not a homoge-
nous experience: it is influenced by the extent to which an individual experiences 
other forms of intersecting discrimination, such as on the grounds of race, religion, 
class, or disability. Relative power within the matrix of domination (Collins, 2009) 
may protect an individual to some degree, but failure to conform may result in 
ridicule, discrimination, or even violence. As a form of social categorisation, stereo-
types can therefore be used to protect social norms (Tajfel & Forgas, 2000, p. 58). 
An individual who does not conform to a stereotype pertaining to them: for exam-
ple, the woman applying for the firefighter job who has the strength to do it, may 
be criticised (or worse) for being ‘unwomanly’: in other words, for failing to con-
form to the standards set for women. 
Data-based surveillance may not necessarily operate in the state-organised, totali-
tarian manner envisioned in dystopian novels like Orwell’s 1984 and Zamyatin’s 
We. Modern surveillance actors include big tech companies. Shoshana Zuboff has 
argued that ‘surveillance capitalism’ seeks not only to profit from data collected 
about individuals by big tech companies, but also to limit the choices that individ-
uals can make (Zuboff, 2019, p. 143). Hille Koskela notes that “interpersonal moni-
toring”—surveillance— has historically been used to enforce social norms (Koskela, 
2012, p. 49). As surveillance technology has become more sophisticated, Lyon has 
argued that, “what is statistically or organizationally normal becomes the touch-
stone of what is right or at least appropriate" (Lyon, 2002, p. 249). In other words, 
data collection, for data-based surveillance, enables the formulation of prescriptive 
norms: with attendant consequences for those who are not ‘normal’. 
Both gender stereotypes and data-based surveillance, therefore, can act as tools of 
control. With the help of both, certain kinds of behaviours are normalised and in-
centivised, while others are punished: sometimes with violence. Surveillance tech-
nologies and gender stereotypes both set limits on human actions and behaviours, 
and on ways of existing in the world. This can be through retaining power in the 
hands of those who already hold it, or through framing certain individuals as in 
need of ‘protection’ from others. In both cases, both gender stereotypes and data-
based surveillance have the heaviest impact on those who are already margin-
alised. 
Surveillance, stereotyping and discrimination for 
welfare claimants in the UK 
In this section, I will argue that the increased use of surveillance in the welfare 
system in the UK multiplies the extent to which welfare claimants are monitored 
for compliance with gender norms and stereotypes, risking a vicious cycle in which 
claimants, fearing discrimination and denial of benefits, are increasingly coerced 
into compliance. I will examine how this cycle can be harmful at both individual 
and societal levels, and suggest how human rights can frame and support resis-
tance. 
While in this section I focus on the UK, it should be noted that the UK is not alone 
in using surveillance in its welfare provision in order to enforce certain norms and 
behaviours. In the US, for example, the US Aid to Dependent Children pro-
gramme—created in 1935 as part of the New Deal—provided assistance to women 
with children. It was subject to eligibility requirements, which excluded women 
who were considered ‘employable’ or ‘sexually immoral’ (Eubanks, 2018, p. 29). 
The impact of surveillance of welfare claimants in the UK has been documented 
both in how it acts to categorise people—implicitly as ‘deserving’ or ‘undeserving,’ 
as ‘striver’ or ‘shirker’—and has a disciplinary effect, as those surveilled change 
their behaviour in order to remain entitled to benefits (Wright et al., 2020). Howev-
er, the categorisation of claimants as ‘deserving’ (or ‘undeserving’) of benefits relies 
on the extent to which they conform to stereotypes about gender. Over the past 
century, therefore, welfare surveillance has been used to enforce gender stereotyp-
ing: the closer an individual—and their circumstances—conform to these stereo-
types, the more likely they are to receive welfare benefits. 
As discussed above, early post-war welfare policy considered women as depen-
dents of men. In the 1950s and 1960s, the National Assistance Board used a spe-
cial investigative unit to surveil claimants. This unit focused on two areas: identi-
fying men with unreported earnings, and women claimants who were cohabiting 
with a man. In this second category, investigations focused on proving a sexual re-
lationship between the woman claimant and the man with whom she was cohabit-
ing. While only marriage gave women legal rights to support from male partners, 
the National Assistance Board denied assistance to women cohabiting with a man, 
regardless of whether they were married (V. Noble, 2009, pp. 63–66). Racist and 
classist gender stereotypes were used to apply specific scrutiny to women who 
took in male lodgers, and to West Indian women, both of whom were deemed like-
ly to be cohabiting with men and therefore ineligible for benefits (V. Noble, 2009, 
pp. 63–65). 
By the 1980s, the increased welfare conditionality measures (described above) ini-
tially focused on white working-class men, but by the end of the 20th century also 
targeted lone parents (who were, and are, mostly women) (Fletcher & Wright, 
2018, p. 339). In the 1990s, under the Conservative government led by Major, lone 
mothers continued to be seen as a “moral problem” which could be addressed 
through withdrawing benefits and pressuring them to join the labour force (V. No-
ble, 2009, p. 6). The New Labour government, which increasingly focused policies 
on families with children, saw marriage as best for these families (Lewis, 2000, p. 
99), but continued to incentivise work for lone mothers. 
Successive governments targeted specific groups—for New Labour, the ‘socially ex-
cluded,’ while for the Coalition and Conservative governments, the ‘troubled fami-
lies’—who were deemed to require a strong state response, in what Parton has 
characterised as an ‘authoritarian neoliberal’ state (Parton, 2014). Post-2010 wel-
fare policy has focused on still further increased conditionality which effectively 
punishes certain behaviours and ways of life: these include a cap on benefits pay-
ments per household and a two-child limit for benefits supporting children (Millar, 
2019, pp. 89–90). 
The introduction of Universal Credit, discussed above, has been characterised as a 
system which moves entirely away from needs-based benefits, and instead seeks 
to exert control over behaviour and values. Millar and Bennett have argued that 
the system ignores the realities of low-income people, arguing that "Universal 
Credit seems designed to suit the people that ministers believe claimants should 
become, rather than starting from where they are now" (Millar & Bennett, 2017, p. 
175). 
Harmful to individuals 
Gender stereotypes, and data-based surveillance, are both hard to avoid. But the 
extent to which an individual can evade many of the harms of both depends on 
their position in society. As with many other social forces, the harms of both act 
most strongly against people who are already in a situation of marginalisation. 
The use of data-based surveillance in welfare has been documented to cause harm 
to individuals: Human Rights Watch has documented how Universal Credit calcula-
tions are based on data collected over time periods that do not match the periods 
in which people in work receive their pay, over- or under-estimating their income 
as a result and leaving claimants struggling when they receive less than what they 
are entitled to (Human Rights Watch, 2020). Data-based surveillance for Universal 
Credit is also ‘digital-by-default’, meaning that claimants who are unable to access 
the internet may be sanctioned for failing to comply with requirements that they 
are not aware of (Booth, 2019; OHCHR, 2018). 
Evading data-based surveillance requires not only technical sophistication, but al-
so a specific position in society: one in which an individual is not dependent on 
state support and its increasing levels of data collection and monitoring. This is 
difficult for many people, and impossible for others. Evading the harms of gender 
stereotyping also requires some power within the matrix of domination: a position 
in which a person can protect themselves from the consequences of not conform-
ing to expectations based on their legal, social or self-identified gender. Individual 
rejection of gender stereotypes can put individuals at risk of harm from those who 
have an interest in maintaining the stereotypes: individual rejection of surveillance 
technologies can result in individuals being targeted for additional scrutiny, re-
stricted in their activity, or punished as criminals. 
Harmful to societal structures 
I have described above how both gender stereotypes and data-based surveillance 
are tools of control: as a consequence, they both act to reinforce and strengthen 
existing hierarchies of power. This can be through retaining power in the hands of 
those who already hold it: or through framing certain individuals as in need of 
‘protection’ from others. 
The exact manifestations of gender stereotypes differ around the world and 
through time, but gender stereotypes are a remarkably consistent presence in dif-
ferent cultures. Seguino has argued that stereotypes and norms—including gender 
stereotypes—reflect underlying systems of power relations: these include those set 
up and maintained by institutions that contribute to “gender hierarchical attitudes” 
(Seguino, 2011). According to Cook and Cusack, gender stereotypes can also be de-
ployed to subjugate individuals, or to maintain existing hierarchies of power (Cook 
& Cusack, 2010, p. 17). Gender stereotypes in particular frame women as sub-
servient and inferior, which facilitates unequal power relations along gender lines 
(Holtmaat, 2004, p. xii). 
An individual who fails to conform to prevailing gender stereotypes may be out-
right rejected by the society in which they live, and risks being coerced into one of 
the pre-determined ‘boxes’, regardless of the harm that may result. The unspoken 
result is a wider consequence to this failure to conform. As Holtmaat has argued, 
gender stereotypes may form a crucial part of national identities, particularly for 
women, whose bodies may form the site for these identities, and whose roles can 
be framed as “foundational” for a state (Holtmaat, 2013, pp. 117–118). Yuval-Davis 
argues further that gender relations are crucial for promulgating a “specific view 
about the meaning of the world and the nature of social order,” and that the ideas 
of a ‘proper man’ and ‘proper woman’ form an important part of this worldview (Yu-
val-Davis, 1997, p. 67). That is to say, failure to conform not only undermines the 
individual or their immediate community, but may undermine the nation state it-
self. Individuals who fail to conform may be ostracised, met with violence, or even 
killed, in the name of ‘protecting’ the nation (Yuval-Davis, 1997, p. 46). 
Surveillance technologies, almost without exception, are controlled by those who 
already hold some form of power, including state actors and powerful corporate 
entities. Data-based surveillance, for example, requires data collection, storage 
and analysis capabilities which increasingly rest only in the hands of large tech-
nology companies. These companies may promote surveillance’s benefits to users, 
in the form of customer convenience, such as the provision of ‘personalised’ ser-
vices. Benefits to the company, which are less public, include the creation of prof-
itable data products, which can be sold to other actors (Zuboff, 2019, pp. 255-262). 
Profit accrues to those in power within these companies: which are not known for 
their diversity of staff, let alone their decision-makers (Myers West et al., 2019). 
The problems caused by homogenous groups building systems that impact on the 
lives of people who are not like them are well-documented (UNESCO & EQUALS 
Skills Coalition, 2019, p. 126). 
It is not only true that gender stereotypes and surveillance technologies reinforce 
each other: it is also true that in so doing, they exacerbate existing hierarchies and 
inequalities. Gender stereotypes can cause real harm to individuals: through deny-
ing recognition of an individual’s worth and dignity, and through denying fair allo-
cation of resources (Cook & Cusack, 2010, p. 59). Surveillance technologies that re-
inforce and amplify these stereotypes only exacerbate this harm. 
As discussed above, both gender stereotypes and the deployment of surveillance 
technologies are underpinned by structures that benefit those already in power. 
Those who benefit from gender stereotypes may be the same people who deter-
mine the design and deployment of surveillance technologies: those who are not 
subjected to surveillance in order to receive state support may be able to avoid 
widespread behaviour policing. 
Resisting surveillance and resisting stereotypes 
As I have argued in this article, there are parallels in the way that gender stereo-
types and surveillance technologies operate in society. Both of these systems act 
to categorise individuals and to control behaviours. Both act to reinforce hierar-
chies and exacerbate inequalities in interoperable ways. These parallels, however, 
also offer opportunities for resistance. In the Netherlands, the SyRI risk assessment 
model was used to calculate the risk of benefits fraud, but a Dutch court found 
that the invasion of privacy was not justified and that it discriminated on the 
grounds of socioeconomic status and migrant status (Henley & Booth, 2020). 
The methods developed by legal and feminist scholars like Cook and Cusack for 
identifying gender stereotypes and how they operate to discriminate, may also 
prove useful for identifying increasingly hidden and surreptitious surveillance and 
dataveillance methods. Understanding how gender stereotypes may cause 
harm—how they degrade, diminish, deny benefits to individuals, and impose bur-
dens (Cook & Cusack, 2010, pp. 60–65)—may help to understand how surveillance 
technologies cause harm, and may provide a useful lens for interrogating these 
technologies. 
At the same time, understanding how surveillance technologies operate and par-
ticularly how dataveillance is capturing more and more information about specific 
details of individual lives, can help to interrogate gender stereotypes. While it is 
true that many of these systems remain opaque, protected by intellectual property 
laws, more and more stakeholders are pushing for transparency in data systems. 
Understanding how these systems categorise and quantify human lives may help 
surface the ways that these categorisations act in other areas. Holding the systems 
to account may help hold the societies that build these systems to account in turn. 
Conclusion 
The welfare system in the UK has historically been designed to favour certain, 
stereotypical, family models. While the nature of these stereotypes has shifted 
since the establishment of the post-war welfare state, including increasingly 
recognising women as citizens in their own right, the post-2010 welfare reforms 
are designed for the circumstances of a stereotypical couple and their children, un-
dermining women’s financial independence and ignoring the realities of life for 
people on low incomes. At the same time, increased conditionality for welfare ben-
efits—which allocate benefits on the basis of compliance with behaviours, instead 
of according to need—has led to increasing surveillance of welfare claimants, in-
creased use of data, data sharing and data-based surveillance to monitor 
claimants. 
The combination of gender stereotyping and surveillance in the UK welfare state 
risks creating a vicious cycle, in which the categorisation and control dimensions 
of both stereotyping and surveillance reinforce each other. This risks coercing wel-
fare claimants—by definition, people living on low incomes—into certain ‘accepted’ 
behaviours, and discriminating against those who do not conform. The increased 
conditionality of welfare benefits has already caused demonstrative harm to those 
who cannot or struggle to access Universal Credit. The coercive, surveillant nature 
of the welfare state risks cementing hierarchies of power which continue to stereo-
type and discriminate against low-income people, in particular low-income women 
who are expected to balance the demands of their disproportionate unpaid caring 
responsibilities as well as increasing requirements for job search activities. 
Against this backdrop of coercion and conditionality, however, applying a human 
rights analysis—including recognition of the harms of gender stereotyping, as 
recognised by the CEDAW Committee—allows for the specifically gendered nature 
of the harm caused by surveillance and conditionality to welfare benefits 
claimants. UK law has already recognised the harm that can be caused by rigid as-
sumptions in the welfare benefits system (Earnshaw, 2021). I argue that applying 
analysis of gender stereotyping can further identify—and combat—harms that are 
inherent in the current structure of the welfare benefits system in the UK, with the 
aim of ensuring that benefits are accessible for all who need them. 
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